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Dissuasion is the most obscure of the four defense goals set forth by the Bush Administration in 
the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),[1] and the administration has said little about the 
potential roles of allies with respect to dissuasion. With the administration’s second term at hand, 
however, the topic deserves attention on various grounds. These include the administration’s 
troubled relations with some U.S. allies during its first term, notably over the intervention in Iraq, 
and America’s need for substantial assistance from its allies to meet international security 
challenges. As noted in a rarely-cited passage in the 2002 National Security Strategy,  “There is 
little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the 
sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.”[2] 
This brief essay discusses the concept of dissuasion before examining some of the questions it 
raises for alliance relations. As expounded by the administration, dissuasion strategies—like 
combat and deterrence strategies—apply to adversaries. Allies may be partners in pursuing 
shared strategies against adversaries and/or beneficiaries of U.S. assurance policies. However, if 
one looks beyond official declaratory policy and considers a broad definition of “dissuasion,” 
allies—including the United States—may be the objects of deliberate dissuasion strategies. 
Furthermore, the complex relations among allies may lead to unintended and inadvertent 
dissuasion-like effects.  
Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept  
In testimony before Congress in June 2001 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld listed the four 
defense policy goals that would formally appear in the September 2001 QDR: (1) to assure allies 
and security partners as to the effectiveness of U.S. capabilities and the reliability of U.S. 
commitments; (2) to “dissuade potential adversaries from developing threatening capabilities by 
developing and deploying capabilities that reduce their incentives to compete;” (3) to deter 
aggression and coercion; and (4) to defeat adversaries, “should deterrence and dissuasion fail.” 
Rumsfeld indicated that the dissuasion goal could be achieved by developing “a portfolio of U.S. 
military capabilities, capabilities that could not only help us prevail against current threats, but 
because we possess them, hopefully dissuade potential adversaries from developing dangerous 
new capabilities themselves.” In other words, the superior U.S. ability to prevail was expected to 
lead at least some possible contenders to make a cost-benefit analysis and thereby conclude that 
it would be wiser not to compete in the acquisition of certain military capabilities. In Rumsfeld’s 
words, “investing for the future and developing capabilities to deal with emerging threats... in 
some cases can dissuade them from even developing those capabilities, because it becomes 
clear to them that they’d be throwing good money after bad.”[3] 
The 2001 QDR’s definition of “dissuasion” highlighted the importance of U.S. military-technical 
superiority in convincing potential adversaries not to compete:  
Through its strategy and actions, the United States influences the nature of future military 
competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complicates military planning for potential 
adversaries in the future. Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries 
from initiating future military competitions. The United States can exert such influence through the 
conduct of its research, development, test, and demonstration programs. It can do so by 
maintaining or enhancing advantages in key areas of military capability. Given the availability of 
advanced technology and systems to potential adversaries, dissuasion will also require the 
United States to experiment with revolutionary operational concepts, capabilities, and 
organizational arrangements and to encourage the development of a culture within the military 
that embraces innovation and risk-taking. To have a dissuasive effect, this combination of 
technical, experimental, and operational activity has to have a clear strategic focus.[4] 
In short, according to official definitions, “dissuasion” means to persuade other powers to refrain 
from initiating an “arms race” or competition in military capabilities. Official strategy documents 
suggest that dissuasion is to be achieved by convincing the adversary of the futility of competition 
with the United States, either on a general basis or in a particular category of military power, 
which could be nuclear weapons, fighter aircraft, attack submarines, etc. The goal is to make the 
adversary understand that it would be pointless to compete in the acquisition of such capabilities. 
If that goal cannot be achieved, the 2001 QDR suggested, U.S. investments and activities may 
nonetheless “channel” an adversary’s behavior and “complicate” its planning and thereby shape 
the competition. Dissuasion in the 2001 QDR means persuading others not to acquire specific 
military capabilities or otherwise influencing their force development choices, whereas deterrence 
means convincing others not to employ capabilities they already possess.  
It must nonetheless be recognized that the concept of dissuasion remains vague, with multiple 
interpretations in circulation. Analysts are still exploring possible meanings and mechanisms of 
dissuasion. Some observers have compared the current state of understanding of dissuasion to 
the initial conceptions of deterrence in the 1940s and 1950s. It required several years for U.S. 
and allied experts to agree on the significance of basic distinctions, such as those involving 
central and extended deterrence and types of deterrence threats.  
As an example of the potentially fruitful imprecision of current policy statements, one might note 
that, while most official Department of Defense definitions of dissuasion have emphasized 
discouraging adversaries from seeking or acquiring capabilities, the November 2003 Joint 
Operations Concepts document referred to “Dissuading adversaries from developing threatening 
forces or ambitions.”[5] The allusion to “ambitions” suggests possible distinctions between (a) 
convincing foreign powers not to compete at all, (b) inducing them to abandon efforts to gain 
certain assets, and (c) actively blocking or complicating their continuing attempts to acquire 
specific capabilities. In principle, the pursuit of all three objectives could be undertaken more 
effectively with allied support, for instance through agreements not to transfer arms or 
technologies to potential adversaries.  
Allies as Partners in Dissuasion Efforts  
The roles of allies in formulating and pursuing strategies of dissuasion have yet to be elucidated. 
However, given the historical record, it appears that, even when allies agree on dissuasion 
objectives, they may not agree on how to achieve them. The difficulties stand out in a comparison 
of dissuasion plans with the demands of combat and deterrence strategies.  
Allies have often disagreed on grand strategies for winning a war. Stalin’s demand that Churchill 
and Roosevelt promptly open a second front in Europe is a famous example. Allies have also 
disagreed on deterrence strategies. The French rejection of the U.S. strategy of “flexible 
response” contributed to de Gaulle’s 1966 decision to withdraw France from NATO’s integrated 
military structure and to articulate a distinct national deterrence policy.  
Allies have also disagreed on strategies concerning what could be called “dissuasion” in the 
language of the 2001 QDR. Indeed, they have disagreed on whether the fundamental idea of 
shaping or channeling an arms competition and thereby influencing an adversary’s behavior 
makes sense. Even if they have accepted the idea, they have disagreed about how to define and 
pursue the goal. For example, in the late 1980s, when the U.S. Department of Defense 
articulated the “competitive strategies” approach to defense investments as a means to bound 
Soviet choices and affect Soviet force development decision-making,[6] an ancestor of the 2001 
QDR’s “dissuasion” goal, this approach did not attract much attention in NATO Europe. However, 
the attention it received was primarily critical, because it was regarded as oriented toward 
continuing the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West 
German Foreign Minister, and various other NATO European leaders were at this time calling for 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact to seize the opportunities presented by Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s “new thinking” and to establish “mutual collective security” structures.[7] The 
predominant concept in West Germany and much of NATO Europe during these years was not to 
make military investments that would impose costs on the Soviet Union and thereby divert 
Moscow’s force development in certain directions; it was to end the East-West competition 
entirely. In other words, at the end of the Cold War the preferred concept in NATO Europe for 
relations with the Soviet bloc, one ultimately accepted by the United States, called for terminating 
the arms competition by overcoming the underlying political antagonism. 
In recent years, Washington has placed the agreed NATO work on missile defense within the 
framework of U.S. dissuasion strategy. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other U.S. 
officials have suggested that the NATO allies have a role in dissuasion via missile defense:  
[W]e must develop new assets, the mere possession of which discourages adversaries from 
competing. For example, deployment of effective missile defenses may dissuade others from 
spending to obtain ballistic missiles, because missiles will not provide them what they want: the 
power to hold U.S. and allied cities hostage to nuclear blackmail.[8] 
By this logic, the allied role in dissuading potential adversaries from seeking ballistic missiles will 
grow to the extent that allies and the Alliance as a whole develop and deploy missile defenses. 
Allied observers who have commented on the American theory of dissuasion have generally 
expressed scepticism, however, as to whether the theory has been proven or is even provable.[9] 
One of the objections is that regional powers have motives for seeking missiles—for instance, 
competing with their neighbors—that are distinct from being able to threaten NA TO countries.  
Moreover, without using the term “dissuasion,” Allied observers would generally place more 
emphasis on instruments for discouraging arms competitions other than unchallengeable U.S. or 
NATO military superiority: for instance, promoting regional political stabilization, peace, and 
security through nation-building and state-building, notably to support democratization in post-
conflict situations. Some allied observers contend (a) that improving defensive and intervention 
capabilities may in some cases incite regional powers to intensify their efforts to acquire weapons 
of mass destruction and other military capabilities and (b) that more can and should be done to 
shape the security environment by upholding export controls, legal norms, and nonproliferation 
regimes. In short, dissuasion strategies may be difficult to pursue in an alliance setting because, 
even more than combat or deterrence strategies, they may involve speculative judgements about 
the effects of policies in shaping the choices and behavior of specific adversaries.  
The United States has been engaged in all of the prescribed activities, which have been pursued 
mainly for reasons other than dissuasion. While nonproliferation regimes, development 
assistance, and other cooperative activities have not been highlighted in some U.S. strategy 
documents, they figure significantly in the National Security Strategy. Moreover,the United States 
is increasingly disposed to accept an expanded definition of how to achieve dissuasion, despite 
the emphasis on military superiority in some Department of Defense documents.[10] The clearest 
signs of this include the interest in reconstruction and stabilization in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some 
American analysts have placed reconstruction and stabilization efforts in these countries and 
elsewhere, including Africa and the Balkans, under the heading of dissuasion and “shaping the 
security environment” on the grounds that democratic market-economy states may be expected 
to become the security partners of the United States and its allies instead of engaging in arms 
competitions with their neighbors.[11] The assumption is that authoritarian regimes tend to focus 
on rivalry and that “failed states” may serve as training grounds for terrorism, while democratic 
market-economy states concentrate on pursuing prosperity. The United States has a growing 
interest in gaining increased allied support and participation in reconstruction and stabilization 
efforts, although they will probably not be officially placed under the heading of dissuasion.  
Allies as Objects of Dissuasion Strategies?  
If dissuasion is defined broadly, as efforts undertaken to persuade a foreign power not to seek 
specific military capabilities and/or to shape its military investment choices, it is clear that 
dissuasion has for decades been a fact of life in intra-alliance relations. Indeed, with this broad 
definition, NATO’s collective defense planning process can be seen as in some ways an exercise 
in dissuasion. Allies routinely try to influence each other’s procurement choices so that their fellow 
allies meet agreed goals instead of pursuing national objectives at variance with alliance 
plans.[12] 
It is also plain that the United States has at times been the object of the dissuasion strategies of 
some or all of its NATO allies. Aside from regular consultations, arms control treaties have 
constituted one of the instruments available to allies to influence U.S. force development 
decisions. 
One of the most obvious recent examples of allied efforts to shape U.S. capability development 
concerns missile defense and the 1972 ABM Treaty. In this case, dissuasion by allies was long 
facilitated by the U.S. government’s own inclinations. The NATO allies strongly supported the 
ABM Treaty, owing in part to a conviction that it promoted strategic stability and helped to prevent 
an offense-defense “arms race.” Support for the ABM Treaty meant limiting U.S. missile defenses 
to treaty-permitted levels. In the late 1990s, as U.S. investments in missile defense research and 
development increased, Clinton Administration officials said that the United States was prepared, 
if necessary, to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy missile defenses, but would 
prefer to retain the treaty, with adjustments, owing in part to allied support for the treaty. After 
taking office in January 2001, the Bush administration confirmed its intention to withdraw from the 
treaty, and some NATO European governments openly objected. In June 2001 the French 
government continued to hold, in President Jacques Chirac’s words, that pursuing strategic 
missile defenses outside ABM Treaty constraints “would open the way to new uncontrolled 
competitions.”[13] The Bush Administration nonetheless announced its decision to withdraw from 
the treaty in December 2001, with effect in June 2002.  
Persuading allies not to pursue certain military capabilities has sometimes been an explicit part of 
national policy, notably with respect to U.S. extended deterrence commitments and the nuclear 
nonproliferation commitments of U.S. allies. For example, in adhering to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, Bonn stipulated that “The Federal Government understands that... the security of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and its allies shall continue to be ensured by NATO or an 
equivalent security system.”[14] Similarly, as Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, a prominent Turkish scholar, 
pointed out in 1995, “The Turkish commitment to non-nuclear weapons status is coupled with 
several strong qualifiers.” The caveats associated with U.S. nuclear commitments are perhaps 
the most significant: “the strategic balance between the United States and NATO and the Russian 
Federation must not be allowed to erode, by the former’s unilateral moves to the disadvantage of 
NATO, until Russia gives sustained evidence that it has devalued the role of nuclear weapons in 
its overall foreign policy, including its policy toward the near abroad and their neighbors rather 
than merely in its Western policy... In other words, the extended deterrence of the United States 
must remain convincing and credible to Turks as well as to de facto and de jure nuclear weapons 
states and potential proliferators.”[15] 
According to the Alliance’s 1999 Strategic Concept, “The supreme guarantee of the security of 
the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the 
United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a 
deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.”[16] The 
1999 Strategic Concept also highlights the importance of “coupling” to the U.S. strategic nuclear 
posture via U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces in Europe: “Nonetheless, NATO will maintain, at the 
minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces 
based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the 
transatlantic link.”[17] 
This statement usefully recalls the principle that in the “dissuasion” of allies (that is, persuading 
them to exercise restraint in the acquisition of specific types of military capabilities) another 
concept articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review is important—assurance. Allies 
assured of the consistency of U.S. foreign policies, the genuineness of U.S. security 
commitments, and the adequacy of U.S. capabilities to honor those commitments may be less 
likely to augment their own capabilities.  
This generalization must, however, be qualified on a case-by -case basis. Allies differ in their 
ambitions and capacity to compete. Some allies, like most small powers in history, rely heavily on 
alliance arrangements for their security, rather than on their own military capabilities. Other allies 
(for instance, France and the United Kingdom) have long traditions of national autonomy as great 
powers, and remain correspondingly less willing to accept dependence on others. From this 
perspective, it is not surprising that Britain and France are both nuclear weapons states and have 
the greatest expeditionary and power-projection capabilities among the NATO European allies. 
If one can regard the constraints imposed on a defeated power as a form of dissuasion, some 
NATO European allies have dissuaded a fellow ally from seeking certain types of military 
capabilities. In accordance with the London and Paris agreements of 1954, the 1948 Brussels 
Treaty furnished the basis upon which West Germany and Italy were admitted to the Western 
European Union (WEU), together with the original Brussels Treaty signatories—France, Britain, 
and the Benelux countries. West Germany at this time renounced the production of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons on its territory, and accepted numerous restrictions on its 
conventional armaments—all within the WEU framework. The WEU established an Agency for 
the Control of Armaments to conduct inspections and supervise West Germany’s compliance with 
these restrictions. The WEU restrictions on the Federal Republic of Germany’s conventional 
armaments—types and sizes of ships, ranges of missiles, etc.—were relaxed over a period of 
three decades, but not completely lifted until 1 January 1986.[18] 
In addition to the formal restrictions on the armaments of the Bundeswehr, intra-European 
political inhibitions also helped to dissuade the Federal Republic of Germany from increasing its 
military capabilities beyond a certain level during the Cold War. In 1975, for example, Defense 
Minister Georg Leber gave the following reply when asked about reports that the United States 
favored expanding the Bundeswehr to 600,000 troops: 
There are many arguments against that. It is not as if the Federal Republic of Germany led a 
charmed life—not from an economic perspective either—and could afford everything. But more 
importantly, if the Germans were to increase their army while the others were to reduce theirs, 
inner-European problems would arise with certainty, because of the excessive weight that such a 
German army would then have in the circle of the West European military powers. And I must 
preserve Europe from that.[19] 
The critical distinction between persuasion in relations with allies and dissuasion vis à vis 
adversaries reflects the fact that allies have recognized their interdependence and shared 
security interests with formal mutual defense pledges. The incentives in alliance relations differ 
from those involving adversaries in that allies rely on a presumption of continuing cooperation to 
meet shared objectives. Elements of distrust, competition, and antagonism tend to be explicit 
rather than latent in adversarial relations. 
Historically, with the exception of nuclear forces, the United States has not been preoccupied with 
convincing its NATO allies not to acquire capabilities but with persuading them to do more. 
Indeed, no deliberate effort to dissuade allies from becoming competitors has been worth 
considering when allies have been reluctant to spend on military forces and have preferred to rely 
on U.S. protection. During the Cold War, the Alliance’s burden-sharing debate consisted of U.S. 
efforts to convince the Allies to spend more on military capabilities, particularly conventional 
forces, while most of the Allies preferred to rely on U.S. nuclear commitments for their security. In 
1981 Josef Joffe concluded that, “In the last analysis, the Bundeswehr is not a tool of policy but 
the price of America’s continued security guarantee.”[ 20] In the same year Horst Mendershausen 
wrote that West Germans “regard burden sharing not so much as a matter of division of military 
responsibilities as a kind of price to be paid for American protection.”[21] Michael Howard, then 
Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford University, offered a similar generalization about 
NATO Europe in 1982: 
[T]he peoples of Western Europe effectively abandoned responsibility for their own defense. Their 
own armed forces, forces which have always had the social role of embodying national self-
consciousness and will to independent existence, became almost peripheral, part of a 
mechanism of nuclear deterrence the ultimate control of which lay elsewhere.[22] 
In other words, there has long been a tension between (a) U.S. extended deterrence protection 
and the U.S. supply of security services that have the effect of making Allies into dependents, at 
least to some degree, and (b) U.S. demands for more balanced burden-sharing and for narrowing 
the U.S.-European capabilities gap, with a view to lessening Allied dependence on U.S. military 
capabilities.[23] 
It would be inconsistent on the part of the United States to demand that its allies contribute more 
to the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture and also refrain from pursuing capabilities that 
could enable them to do so, lest they become better equipped to turn into America’s “strategic 
competitors.” Some Americans might prefer that the NATO Allies (and other allies, such as Japan 
and South Korea) improve their abilities to perform certain military tasks, such as peacekeeping 
and conventional combat operations, but avoid acquiring capabilities on a par with those of the 
United States in areas such as information operations and global space-based C4ISR (command, 
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). Restricting 
allies to certain capabilities has not, however, been the main thrust of U.S. policy in NATO since 
the late 1990s. It has been largely at the initiative of the United States that the Alliance has taken 
steps such as establishing Allied Command Transformation and the NATO Response Force. The 
U.S. goal has been to encourage allies to invest more in advanced military assets and thereby to 
prevent a widening of the trans-Atlantic “capabilities gap” and to ensure, to the maximum extent 
possible, continued interoperability and effective communications connectivity. 
Moreover, as some European analysts have observed, some of the Bush administration’s first 
term policy statements can be seen as paradoxically a form of “counter-dissuasion” in alliance 
relations—that is, motivating the NATO allies to improve their capabilities. In January 2002, for 
example, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that “The mission must determine the 
coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission. If it does, the mission will be dumbed 
down to the lowest common denominator, and we can’t afford that.”[24] Some Allied observers 
have jumped to the conclusion that the United States intends to favor ad hoc coalitions of the 
willing over the standing Alliance, and have argued on the basis of this assumption that their 
governments must invest more in capabilities designed (a) to reduce their dependence on 
Washington, (b) to operate aut onomously outside the NATO framework, and (c) to increase 
interoperability with the United States and other allies. 
Unanswered Questions  
In 1992, in an incisive analysis, Andrew Krepinevich raised a number of questions about the 
implications of what was then called “the military-technical revolution,” notably with regard to 
alliance relations: 
Do we wish to develop the next generation military capabilities jointly with our allies, or do we 
hope to maintain some margin of advantage over all other countries? Do we envision coalition 
warfare in which our friends are as capable as ourselves? Or in which we provide certain kinds of 
military services or functions that our friends lack? Do we attempt to discourage first-rate military 
technical competitors by sharing capabilities and winning trust, ‘lending’ capabilities and building 
dependence, or maintaining superior capabilities and building entry barriers? Will ‘natural,’ 
economic limitations on what our allies can do make these issues moot (by making some 
advanced capabilities unaffordable to them) or make these issues more delicate (by making their 
capabilities more clearly dependent on our willingness to share)? Should our policies in these 
matters differ across different warfare missions?[25] 
These questions may make the choices appear simpler and starker than they have been for 
policy-makers caught up in day-to-day decisions.It is likely that no comprehensive responses 
have been formulated because of the inherent complexity of these issues, the urgency of 
immediate operations and deterrence objectives, and bureaucratic compartmentalization, among 
other factors. Technology transfer restrictions, for example, have been piecemeal and subject to 
frequent redefinition, owing (among other factors) to reassessments of publicly available 
technologies and of the importance and sensitivity of specific capabilities. At any rate, it would be 
damaging for alliance cohesion for the United States to articulate a policy on the dissuasion of its 
allies. A sign of the controversy that could be associated with an explicit policy in this regard 
came in March 1992, when some excerpts from the February 1992 classified draft Defense 
Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999 were made public. Some critics wondered if 
the draft goal of “precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor” could apply 
to America’s current allies in Europe and Asia.[26] 
The alliance relations aspect of dissuasion strategy nonetheless merits more attention. It has 
become more complicated since the end of the Cold War, because some allies have manifested 
a greater interest than in the past in pursuing capabilities collectively in multilateral frameworks 
(e.g., the European Union or smaller groupings) distinct from the Atlantic Alliance. In December 
1998 U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright deplored “duplication” in the armaments efforts 
of the NATO Allies that are also members of the European Union.[27] Albright’s intervention, the 
initial U.S. response to the British-French St.-Malo proposal to give the European Union greater 
security and defense responsibilities, gained greater visibility than a series of U.S. expressions of 
anxiety about European defense initiatives outside NATO since the early 1990s, including 
concerns about the European Corps first proposed by France and Germany in 1991. Albright’s 
strictures against duplication could be interpreted as a vaguely formulated U.S. attempt at 
dissuasion. Her strictures raised questions that have yet to be definitively answered. Which forms 
of duplication in Allied capabilities should be considered constructive—for example, transport 
aircraft and aerial refueling tankers? Which forms of duplication could be deemed divisive and 
wasteful—for instance, European Union military communications networks separate from those 
acquired under NATO auspices? To what extent is the European Union prepared to reduce its 
reliance on U.S. and NATO assets and capabilities? 
Whether and how the “dissuasion of allies” has been been achieved historically—and whether 
and to what extent it has been a deliberate U.S. policy in certain capability domains—constitute 
important but unexplored questions. The United States may have achieved unplanned and 
unintended dissuasive effects on the defense efforts of allies that have chosen to rely on U.S. 
protection and to scale back their own military investments. Without intending to achieve this 
outcome, in other words, the United States may have had dissuasion-like effects on allied 
decision-making, at least with respect to certain types of capabilities. The United States has 
probably had dissuasive effects on the choices of some allies for various reasons, including the 
following: some allies may have been pleased to have Washington provide capabilities that they 
did not have to pay for; some may have chosen to buy American-made items of equipment 
because U.S. financial, technological, and/or industrial advantages have led to an American 
ability to produce some types of military equipment more cheaply than European suppliers; some 
may have been indirectly influenced by U.S. industrial policies such as “Buy America” legislation 
that have limited the market for European manufacturers and that have thereby increased the 
price of their products; and some may have found their options circumscribed by U.S. restrictions 
on technology transfers. 
As this observation suggests, some allies may be rivals not only in the acquisition of new 
capabilities for their own armed forces but also in the production and sale of new capabilities in 
world markets. In other words, alliance relations illustrate a further tension in U.S. preferences: 
support for improved Allied military capabilities, to lessen dependence on the United States and 
to gain stronger partners in meeting security challenges, versus concern about the diffusion of 
technologies and capabilities to current or potential competitors. U.S. technology transfer 
restrictions, “black box” arrangements, and interoperability priorities, among other matters, raise 
an array of questions concerning dissuasion and alliance relations that have yet to be 
satisfactorily answered. Cases in which allies may have at times influenced and exerted 
dissuasion-like effects on U.S. force development choices in Alliance deliberations about strategy 
and procurement and in other international forums—notably multilateral negotiations about 
nuclear testing and various types of capabilities—also deserve more analysis and further study. 
In sum, the implications of the concept of dissuasion for America’s relations with its allies have 
yet to be fully explored. These implications are bound to be complex because allies can be 
partners in implementing dissuasion strategies against adversaries while trying simultaneously to 
influence each other’s force development and other decisions. The United States has itself been 
the object of allied influence attempts; and Washington has intermittently revealed a certain 
tension—what some European experts have called “schizophrenia”—in its reactions to European 
defense efforts. That is, the United States has since the early 1950s called upon its European 
allies to spend more on military capabilities but has, especially since the early 1990s, often 
expressed concern about European efforts pursued in frameworks outside NATO. The United 
States will have to be more attentive to this tension in the coming years, because the European 
Union is unlikely to abandon its efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Policy and 
corresponding capabilities. This means that structuring NATO -EU relations will remain a key 
issue in alliance policy. The United States may have to choose between trying to encourage or 
“dissuade” specific EU efforts, in full awareness that attempts to discourage these efforts could 
backfire and have a “counter-dissuasion” effect. 
Exploring the alliance relations aspects of dissuasion and other strategic concepts could offer an 
opportunity for the United States during the second Bush administration. The successful pursuit 
of the Alliance ’s operations and force development initiatives will not be possible without an 
improved understanding of (a) their underlying strategic rationales, (b) the national policies of the 
NATO allies, and (c) allied efforts outside the NATO framework, notably in the European Union. 
While U.S. public information efforts concerning the conceptual framework underpinning the QDR 
and associated policies have been inadequate and ineffective,[28] a more profound problem 
resides in the scarcity of informed in-depth debate about strategy in the Alliance . Despite the 
ponderous nature of NATO decision-making (a protracted process of consensus-formation), it 
would be advantageous to promote a far-reaching discussion in the alliance about the strategic 
concepts favored by the United States and other allies. Postponing discussion would only ensure 
that divergent perspectives on concepts such as dissuasion, deterrence, and preemption remain 
poorly understood in the United States and allied nations; and this would leave the field to half-
truths and misunderstandings. Promoting discussion would enhance the prospects for effective 
alliance cooperation in formulating and pursuing strategies of dissuasion, deterrence, and (if 
necessary) combat.  
Note: The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not represent those of the Department 
of the Navy or any U.S. government agency. Special thanks are owed to Cees Coops, Kurt Guthe, 
Martin Neill, Joseph Pilat, and Michael Rühle for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. An 
earlier version of this paper was presented on September 22, 2004 at the workshop on 
“Dissuasion in U.S. Defense Strategy” organized by the Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval 
Postgraduate School, and sponsored by Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems 
and Concepts Office. Most of the papers presented at this workshop are available in the October 
2004 edition of Strategic Insights, the Center for Contemporary Conflict’s e-journal.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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